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RETRIBUTIVIST THEORIES’ CONJOINED TWINS PROBLEMS 
Brittany L. Deitch 
This Article expands a previously published article, which introduced 
a novel problem to the centuries-old debate on the retributivist 
justification of punishment. The first article applied the problem of 
conjoined twins, where one commits a crime and the other is innocent, 
to pure retributivism. The conjoined twins problem showed that pure 
retributivism, which holds absolute duties to punish all who are guilty 
and none who are innocent, fails as a complete theory of punishment. 
This Article broadens the application of the conjoined twins problem by 
applying the problem to other versions of retributivism, including 
deontological, consequentialist, threshold, negative/weak, victim-
conscious, and mixed retributivist theories. Exploring each version in 
turn, this Article uses the conjoined twins problem to show that no 
version of retributivism can serve as a complete theory of punishment. 
  
 
* Case Writing Fellow, Harvard Law School. I would like to thank Russell Christopher and Stephen 
Galoob for piquing my interest in theories of punishment and for advising and supporting me throughout 
my first Article and this expansion. I would also like to thank Will Thomas for his valuable criticisms of 
an earlier version of this Article.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following:1 A set of conjoined twins, Guilty Twin and 
Innocent Twin, has an argument with Victim. Guilty Twin murders 
Victim despite Innocent Twin’s protests. Guilty Twin has complete 
dominion over the right arm used to wield the murder weapon. Innocent 
Twin could not prevent the crime from occurring. Guilty Twin is clearly 
guilty; Innocent Twin is clearly innocent. To avoid complicating this 
hypothetical with the legal and ethical questions surrounding a court-
ordered separation for the twins, suppose the twins are conjoined in such 
a way that they share vital organs making separation impossible without 
causing the death of both twins. The twins stand trial with only Guilty 
Twin named as a defendant. If Guilty Twin is punished, Innocent Twin 
will necessarily suffer the punishment. However, forgoing punishing the 
innocent sets the guilty twin free. Thus, only two options are available: 
punish both twins or punish neither twin. What should the criminal law 
do?2 What must3 or may4 a retributivist do? 
 
 1. This problem was originally presented in an earlier publication and applied to pure 
retributivism to demonstrate pure retributivism’s failure to serve as a comprehensive theory of 
punishment. Brittany L. Deitch, Retributivism’s Conjoined Twins Problem, 53 CRIM. L. BULL. 953 
(2017). 
 2. Although this problem seems far-fetched or implausible, American courts have struggled 
with imposing criminal penalties upon conjoined defendants on at least four occasions. None of these 
cases addressed murder charges. The first involved assault. The second involved assault and battery. 
The third involved breach of the peace. The fourth involved an arrestable traffic offense. Deitch, supra 
note 1, at 964-66. 
 3. Strong versions of retributivism hold an absolute duty to punish. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, 
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 142 (Mary Gregor trans., 1991) (1797) (posing his famous disbanding 
island society hypothetical, and arguing that even though there would be no deterrent effect of 
punishment, every last murderer in that society’s prison must be punished so that “blood guilt does not 
2
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Stated most simply and generally, retributivism is a theory that 
justifies punishment on the basis of the offender’s culpability or desert.5 
Retributivism’s Conjoined Twins Problem, this Article’s predecessor, 
applied the conjoined twins problem to what may be termed pure 
retributivism, a “jealous theory”6 that holds equal duties7 and categorical 
imperatives to punish all who are guilty and none who are innocent.8 
That article discusses the conjoined twins problem with an emphasis on 
the significance of the personhood of the twins.9 Regardless of whether 
a pure retributivist views the twins as two distinct persons or as two 
halves of one whole person, his theory fails to determine whether 
punishment of Guilty Twin is justified under the core tenets of his 
 
cling to the people for not having insisted upon this punishment; for otherwise the people can be 
regarded as collaborators in this public violation of justice.”); See also, MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING 
BLAME: A THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 154 (1997) (“As a theory of a kind of justice, [retributivism] 
obligates us to seek retribution through the punishment of the guilty. This means that officials have a 
duty to punish deserving offenders . . . .”) (emphasis in original); Russell L. Christopher, Deterring 
Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just” Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843, 866 n.119 (2002) 
(explaining “obligatory retributivism,” which holds that, because an offender has the “right to be 
punished,” he must be punished) [hereinafter Christopher, Deterring]. 
 4. Some versions of retributivism merely provide permission to punish. See Christopher, 
Deterring, supra note 3, at 866 n.120 (contrasting permissive retributivism with obligatory retributivism 
to explain that “permissive retributivism does not mandate punishment, but merely justifies its 
permissibility.”). 
 5. See Christopher, Deterring, supra note 3, at 845 n.1 (2002) ("Retributivism is a theory, or 
justification, of punishment.”); MOORE, supra note 3, at 92 (“[R]etributivism asserts that punishment is 
properly inflicted because, and only because, the person deserves it. That some people deserve 
punishment on such a theory is both a necessary and a sufficient condition justifying criminal 
sanctions.”); Joel Feinberg, The Classic Debate, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 614 (Joel Feinberg & 
Hyman Gross eds., 1991) (“Punishment is justified only on the ground that wrongdoing merits 
punishment.”); A.M. Quinton, On Punishment, in PHIL. PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT 6, 7 (Gertrude 
Ezorsky ed., SUNY Press 1972) (“The essential contention of retributivism is that punishment is only 
justified by guilt.”). For an overview of the debate between retributivism and its competing theory of 
punishment, consequentialism, see generally Christopher, Deterring, supra note 3, at 855-65. 
 6. See George P. Fletcher, The Place of Victims in the Theory of Retribution, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. 
REV. 51, 52 (1999) (“[R]etributivism is a jealous theory in the sense that whatever the beneficial side-
effects of punishment, if it is not deserved it cannot possibly be justified.”). 
 7. See MOORE, supra note 3, at 157 (“[T]he guilty going unpunished is exactly the same 
magnitude of evil as the innocent being punished.”). 
 8. The most prominent modern proponent of this theory is Michael Moore, who vigorously 
explains and defends pure retributivism in his book Placing Blame. Id. at 92 (“[R]etributivism asserts 
that punishment is properly inflicted because, and only because, the person deserves it. That some 
people deserve punishment on such a theory is both a necessary and a sufficient condition justifying 
criminal sanctions.”); Id. at 154 (“As a theory of a kind of justice, [retributivism] obligates us to seek 
retribution through the punishment of the guilty. This means that officials have a duty to punish 
deserving offenders . . . .”) (emphasis in original); see also Michael T. Cahill, Retributive Justice in the 
Real World, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 815, 848 (2007) (explaining that retributivists have equal moral duties 
to punish the guilty and not punish the innocent). 
 9. See generally Deitch, supra note 1, at 970 (“The retributivist might treat twins A and B as 
two halves of one whole person and elect to punish . . . On the other hand, if the retributivist treats 
conjoined twins as two distinct persons, then he must decide which duty supersedes the other.”). 
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theory.10 Under a two-person conceptualization, a pure retributivist 
would violate his positive duty to punish all who are guilty (with respect 
to Guilty Twin) if he forgoes punishing the twins, or his negative duty to 
never punish an innocent (with respect to Innocent Twin) if he opts to 
punish the twins. Under a same-person conceptualization, a pure 
retributivist would elect punishment of the twins because the twins are 
responsible for a murder. However, the same-person conceptualization 
is unsupported by legal and biological treatment of conjoined twins. 
Further, assigning desert-based punishment is insurmountably 
complicated when two minds–one guilty and one innocent–are at play. 
By exploring every possible approach, a pure retributivist might take in 
determining whether punishment is justified or prohibited, 
Retributivism’s Conjoined Twins Problem concludes that pure 
retributivism fails as a comprehensive theory of punishment because of 
its inability to resolve the conjoined twins problem without violating one 
of its core tenets.  
This Article presents and applies the conjoined twins problem to 
impure versions of retributivism. This expansion comprehensively 
explores all versions of retributivism to examine whether any existing 
variety of retributivism can satisfactorily resolve the conjoined twins 
problem. Part I succinctly summarizes Retributivism’s Conjoined Twins 
Problem to establish the analytical framework employed throughout this 
Article. Part II provides brief descriptions of each version of 
retributivism: deontological, consequentialist, threshold, negative, 
victim-oriented, and mixed/hybrid. Following each overview is an 
application of that version’s principles to the conjoined twins problem. 
After meticulously considering whether each version can satisfactorily 
resolve the conjoined twins problem under its tenets, this Article 
concludes that the conjoined twins problem reveals a fatal flaw of each 
and every desert-based justification of punishment. Even where a 
version seems able to resolve the problem through punishment or release 
of the twins, its resolution draws attention to the theory’s other internal 
flaws.  
II. OVERVIEW OF PURE RETRIBUTIVISM’S CONJOINED TWINS 
PROBLEM 
Pure retributivism holds two categorical, absolute duties: the positive 
duty to punish the guilty and the negative duty to never punish the 
innocent.11 By contrast, the competing theory of punishment, 
 
 10. See generally Deitch, supra note 1, at 982. 
 11. See, e.g., Quinton, supra note 5, at 137 (“[W]e cannot punish the innocent and must only 
punish the guilty.”) (emphasis in original). 
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consequentialism, holds that punishment is justified when the good 
consequences for society flowing from the punishment outweigh the bad 
consequences for society.12 Critics of pure retributivism argue that pure 
retributivism’s twin duties cannot be satisfied in light of the common 
prosecutorial practices of plea-bargaining and immunity,13 the practical 
impossibility of a zero-error rate in convictions,14 and the inevitable 
suffering of the wrongdoer’s family and friends.15 Retributivists reply to 
these charges by rejecting the common prosecutorial practices,16 relying 
upon the doctrine of double effect,17 defining punishment to exclude the 
suffering of non-offenders from its definition,18 or falling back on a 
softer version of retributivism.19 
None of these standard defenses can save retributivism from the 
problem conjoined twins presents.20 The conjoined twins problem does 
not depend on the existence of any particular practice or system of 
 
 12. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUST. 1336, 
1338 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983) (“The dominant approaches to justification [of punishment] are 
retributive and utilitarian [a synonym for consequentialism]. Briefly stated, a retributivist claims that 
punishment is justified because people deserve it; a utilitarian believes that justification lies in the useful 
purposes that punishment serves.”). 
 13. See Russell L. Christopher, The Prosecutor’s Dilemma: Bargains and Punishments, 72 
FORDHAM L. REV. 93 (2003-2004) (presenting the Prosecutor’s Dilemma, where a prosecutor must 
violate one duty or the other when deciding whether to make an offer of immunity to one prisoner in 
order to punish that prisoner’s confederates) [hereinafter Christopher, Dilemma]; Michael T. Cahill, 
supra note 8, at 854 (“Under the absolutist model [of retributivism], law enforcement at the 
prosecutorial stage would focus on making certain that all, and only, identified wrongdoers were 
punished in an amount appropriate to their desert. Accordingly, the absolutist model would categorically 
ban plea bargaining, witness immunity, downward departures for substantial assistance, or any other 
failure to impose deserved punishment.”). 
 14. See, e.g., Richard O. Lempert, An Assessment of the Moral Bases of the Case for Capital 
Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1177, 1182 (1981) (“Retributivism is also haunted by those executions of 
the innocent which inevitably occur if the death penalty is allowed.”). 
 15. See, e.g., Christopher, Deterring, supra note 3, at 879 (“Another way that retributivism is 
claimed to justify intentional punishment of the innocent is that infliction of punishment on a guilty 
offender will most likely inflict pain and suffering on his or her friends and family who are innocent of 
the offense.”). 
 16. See Christopher, Dilemma, supra note 13, at 99 (“Retributivists implicitly assume that the 
incompatibility of bargain justice and retributivism warrants rejection of the former.”). 
 17. See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA 1656 (Fathers of the English Dominican 
Prince trans., 1947) II-II, quest. 64, 7th art. (establishing the doctrine of double effect, which justifies an 
act which has both a good and a bad consequence if only the good consequence is intended and the bad 
consequence is an unfortunate side-effect); Christopher, Deterring, supra note 3, at 920 (“Since only the 
good effect of punishment of the guilty is intended and the bad side effect of punishment of the innocent 
or nonculpable is unintended, the conditions for [Aquinas’ doctrine of double effect]’s applicability are 
satisfied.”). 
 18. See Christopher, Deterring, supra note 3, at 879 (“[A] retributivist might reply that such 
suffering by friends and family members fails to fall within the notion of what is meant by 
punishment.”). 
 19. See Deitch, supra note 1, at 963. 
 20. The remaining information in this section can be found in the earlier article. Deitch, supra 
note 1. 
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punishment, because it simply asks whether punishment is justified. The 
doctrine of double effect proves fruitless as a retributivist defense 
because punishment of Innocent Twin is not merely an unintended 
consequence of punishing Guilty Twin. Punishing Guilty Twin requires 
the retributivist to knowingly, intentionally punish an identifiable 
innocent, Innocent Twin. The definitional approach also fails, because if 
Guilty Twin is punished, Innocent Twin will suffer in exactly the same 
way as Guilty Twin. Innocent Twin’s suffering cannot fairly be 
categorized as anything but punishment because his suffering amounts 
to more than an incidental side-effect.21 Retributivists’ arsenal of 
existing defenses is thus unhelpful in avoiding the conjoined twins 
problem. 
Turning to the problem of conjoined twins, the retributivist must 
answer two preliminary questions. First is an inquiry into whether the 
defendant is a person. Once the personhood inquiry is affirmatively 
established, the second step is to ask whether that person is a morally 
responsible agent. The first inquiry is usually taken for granted and has 
not been sufficiently explored in the past. While retributivist Michael 
Moore has developed a personhood theory for identifying whether 
punishment is justified, his theory is unhelpful in establishing the 
personhood status of conjoined twins. The second question usually 
arises in cases of insanity defenses or juvenile adjudications. After 
thoroughly considering sources from which retributivists might draw 
their personhood theory or definition, it becomes apparent that the 
retributivist ought to treat the conjoined twins as two persons. However, 
a particularly resolute retributivist could make some weaker arguments 
that the conjoined twins may be treated as one person.  
Using a two-person conceptualization, pure retributivists must choose 
which core duty to honor and which to violate. To honor their positive 
duty to punish Guilty Twin, they must necessarily violate their negative 
duty to not punish Innocent Twin. To honor the negative duty by 
refusing to punish Innocent Twin, they must violate their positive duty to 
punish Guilty Twin. This is especially problematic for retributivists who 
claim that punishment is the “right” of the guilty, under the belief that 
punishment gives respect to the wrongdoer’s autonomy.22 It also 
 
 21. Deitch, supra note 1, at 963 (discussing criticisms that present examples of retributivists 
punishing innocents and retributivists’ rebuttal that those examples do not amount to “punishment” in 
the technical sense, but merely reflect unfortunate side-effects of actual punishment). 
 22. See, e.g., Christopher, Deterring, supra note 3, at 864 (“Retributivism, however, honors 
offenders to such a degree that it conceives of punishment as the right of the offender.”); G.W.F. HEGEL, 
ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 126 (§100) (Allen W. Wood ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 1991) 
(1821) (“The injury which is inflicted on the criminal is not only just in itself . . . it is also a right for the 
criminal himself.”); HERBERT MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY AND 
MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 41 (1976) (“a person has a right to be punished, meaning by this that a person has 
6
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presents a special problem for those retributivists who refuse to consider 
any person other than the offender in ascertaining whether the guilty 
deserves punishment. For these retributivists, accounting for Innocent 
Twin’s suffering in determining whether Guilty Twin should be punished 
would force them to admit that retributivists should consider the 
suffering of the offender’s family and friends, at least in some cases.  
The same-person conceptualization allows retributivists to avoid the 
problem of choosing between their duties, but it presents a host of other 
problems. First, determining the level of culpability is difficult when 
there are two minds at play at the time of the offense–one guilty and one 
innocent. Second, intuition, biology, and the law all presuppose that the 
twins are two persons. Third, analogizing conjoined twins to a person 
with mental illness fails, because declaring conjoinedness a mental 
illness is unsupported by accepted psychology. Even if mental illness 
was a viable claim, this analogy would backfire because mentally ill 
persons are not considered morally responsible agents, resulting in 
reduced or no punishment.  
Because pure retributivism centers on two absolutist duties, pure 
retributivists’ analysis of whether they may justifiably punish the 
conjoined twins halts after the first two questions. Pure retributivists 
never reach the inquiries that follow the general decision that 
punishment is justified. In an ordinary case involving a non-conjoined 
wrongdoer, the pure retributivist would establish that the wrongdoer is 
(1) a person and (2) a morally responsible agent who is guilty and must 
be punished. Next, the pure retributivist would enter an analysis into the 
appropriate degree of punishment. Pure retributivists never reach this 
question in the conjoined twins problem because of their inability to 
handle the twins’ personhood issues. Some impure versions of 
retributivism successfully advance past the personhood inquiries. 
However, as the analysis advances, they too suffer from fatal flaws in 
determining whether and to what degree the twins may justifiably be 
punished. 
III. IMPURE RETRIBUTIVISM’S CONJOINED TWINS PROBLEMS 
Retributivism may generally be conceptualized as a desert-based23 
 
a right to all those institutions and practices linked to punishment.”); JEFFRIE MURPHY, RETRIBUTION, 
JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 134 (1979) (“The right to be punished and regarded as a responsible agent, 
though sometimes painful when honored, at least leaves one’s status as a moral person in-tact.”); K.G. 
Armstrong, The Retributivist Hits Back, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT: A COLLECTION OF 
PAPERS 471, 484 (H.B. Acton ed., 1969) (“If we penalize the criminal according to what he has done, 
we at least treat him like a man, like a responsible moral agent.”). 
 23. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 12, at 347 (“[P]unishment is justified because people 
deserve it.”).  
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and backward-looking24 justification of punishment. Although this is the 
common thread of the retributivist theory, retributivism takes many 
forms.25 Pure retributivism represents the strongest version of 
retributivism.26 It is absolutist in its terms, firmly holding mandatory 
duties to always punish all who are guilty and to never punish any who 
are innocent. Many weaker versions of retributivism have emerged, 
retaining the desert-based and backward-looking methodology while 
avoiding the criticisms of pure retributivism.27 This Part will provide a 
brief overview of the key tenets of the most prevalent impure versions of 
retributivism: deontological, consequentialist, threshold, negative/weak, 
victim-conscious, and mixed/hybrid.28 An application of each theory to 
the conjoined twins problem follows each overview.  
A. Deontological 
Deontological retributivism, like pure retributivism, views desert as 
both a necessary and sufficient justification of punishment.29 
Deontological retributivism focuses on the blameworthiness of each 
moral agent, considering each offender individually without accounting 
for other parties.30 Because deontological retributivists evaluate the 
 
 24. See, e.g., A. Wesley Cragg, Punishment, in 2 THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 
605, 607 (Christopher Gray ed., Garland, 1999) (“[B]ackward-looking justifications see punishment as a 
response to moral wrongdoing.”); R.A. Duff , Penal Communications: Recent Work in the Philosophy of 
Punishment, 20 CRIME & JUSTICE 1, 6-7 (1996) (“[W]hat unites retributivist conceptions of punishment 
. . . is their insistence that punishment must be justified . . . in terms of its intrinsic character as a 
response to past wrongdoing.”). 
 25. See Christopher, Deterring, supra note 3, at 865 (“There are a considerable number of 
versions of retributivism.”). 
 26. See supra Part I.  
 27. See supra Part I. 
 28. Some versions of retributivism exist only to address particular aspects of justifying 
punishment that are not relevant to the inquiry the conjoined twins problem presents: Whether a 
retributivist may permissibly punish a guilty person when that punishment will also necessarily be 
knowingly imposed upon an identifiable innocent person. For example, moralistic retributivism holds 
that punishment is only justified when the offender’s desert is based upon a moral wrong, and legalistic 
retributivism holds that punishment is only justified when an offender’s desert is based upon his 
violation of a legal crime. Because the guilty twin in the conjoined twin problem has committed a 
murder, his conduct is unquestionably both immoral and illegal. Thus, he deserves punishment under 
both moralistic and legalistic retributivism. The question posed in the conjoined twins problem is an 
inquiry into whether the offender may be punished when an innocent would also be punished, not 
whether the conduct is eligible for punishment. For a discussion of moralistic and legalistic 
retributivism, see Christopher, Deterring, supra note 3, at 866.  
 29. See MOORE, supra note 3, at 156 (“The ‘deontological’ or ‘agent-relative’ retributivist 
regards the act of punishing the guilty as categorically demanded on each occasion, considered 
separately.”); Feinberg, supra note 5, at 614 (“In their pure formulations, [retributive theories] are 
totally free of utilitarian admixture. Moral or legal guilt . . . is not only a necessary condition for 
punishment, it is quite sufficient ‘irrespective of the consequences.’”). 
 30. MOORE, supra note 3, at 156 (“The ‘deontological’ or ‘agent-relative’ retributivist regards 
8
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desert of each individual, they would reject certain prosecutorial 
techniques that are designed to maximize punishment, such as plea 
bargaining.31 For example, an offer of immunity to one offender in 
exchange for his testimony against his confederates would be prohibited 
under deontological retributivism, because the testifying offender must 
be punished for his own wrongdoing, even if such an offer would result 
in the conviction and punishment of his confederates.32 
Deontological retributivists seeking to resolve the conjoined twins 
problem face approximately the same issues as pure retributivism. They 
hold absolute, obligatory duties to punish all who are guilty and none 
who are innocent. Because the conjoined twins problem requires the 
deontological retributivist to choose which duty to honor and which to 
violate, the deontological retributivist faces an irreconcilable dilemma. 
Because deontological retributivism is especially centered on treating 
each moral agent as an individual, without concern for others, the 
conjoined twins problem poses a greater threat to this version of 
retributivism, compared to the other impure versions discussed below. If 
the twins are treated as two persons, it is impossible for the 
deontological retributivist to determine whether punishment is justified. 
To honor his positive duty, the deontological retributivist must punish 
Guilty Twin. To honor his negative duty, he must not punish Innocent 
Twin.  
 The unique problem deontological retributivists face is the 
extraordinary difficulty of treating each twin as an independent 
individual. The twins, by their nature, are physically indivisible. To give 
Guilty Twin his just deserts would violate the negative duty by 
necessarily imposing the same punishment on Innocent Twin. To forgo 
punishment of Innocent Twin would necessarily release Guilty Twin 
from receiving his just deserts. The problem for a deontological 
retributivist is that his theory prohibits him from accounting for the 
desert of others in his determination of whether punishment is justified. 
The conjoined twins problem forces the deontological retributivist to 
consider the desert of one moral agent in assessing whether punishment 
 
the act of punishing the guilty as categorically demanded on each occasion, considered separately.”). 
This probably traces its roots to Kant, who argued that every person must be treated as an end in 
himself. KANT, supra note 3, at 46-47 (“[E]very rational being, exists as an end in itself, not merely as a 
means to the discretionary use of this or that will.”; “Act so that you use humanity, as much in your own 
person as in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end and never merely as means.”) 
(emphasis in original). 
 31. See MOORE, supra note 3, at 158 (“[T]he deontological retributivist might simply deny the 
propriety of [common prosecutorial practices, like bargain justice].”).  
 32. Id. at 158 (“[T]he intentional forgoing of any opportunity to punish a guilty offender in order 
to obtain the conviction and punishment of [another] offender . . . is more of a problem for the 
deontological version of retributivism.”).  
9
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is justified for another moral agent. Thus, the mere acknowledgement of 
the difficulty he has in dealing with the conjoined twins violates 
deontological retributivism. To avoid this violation, the deontological 
could ignore the suffering of Innocent Twin and only look to the desert 
of the named defendant, Guilty Twin. However, once Guilty Twin is 
punished, Innocent Twin’s punishment is unjustified because it violates 
the negative duty of pure retributivism, which deontological 
retributivism adopts. The deontological retributivist cannot honor his 
duties to each twin and cannot fairly treat each twin as an individual.  
Because deontological retributivism’s application to the conjoined 
twins problem faces roughly the same problems as pure retributivism, 
with the additional problem of considering the desert of one in 
calculating the desert of another, deontological retributivists cannot 
resolve the conjoined twins problem. 
B. Consequentialist 
Consequentialist retributivism is the first version of retributivism 
examined in this Article that softens the vengeful33 tone of pure 
retributivism by drawing on consequentialism.34 Consequentialist 
retributivists are motivated by retributivist principles of giving just 
deserts, but are willing to use consequentialist means to maximize 
desert-based punishment.35 Perhaps consequentialist retributivism is best 
explained in contrast to deontological retributivism.36 Deontological 
retributivists treat each person individually when determining whether to 
punish.37 By contrast, consequentialist retributivists seek to maximize 
desert collectively.38 Suppose a prosecutor is prosecuting three guilty 
persons.39 If the prosecutor offers immunity to one of the guilty persons 
in exchange for his testimony against his two confederates, then the 
 
 33. Christopher, Deterring, supra note 3, at 848 (“From its roots in vengeance, bloodlust, 
revenge, retaliation, and eye for an eye, retributivism is pitched as the only theory which, in justifying 
punishment, does justice”). 
 34. Christopher, Dilemma, supra note 13, at 146 (“The two alternative versions of retributivism 
– ‘consequentialist’ retributivism and threshold retributivism – attempt to incorporate the consequences 
of punishment into a retributivist framework.”). 
 35. Id. at 147 (“[C]onsequentialist retributivism seeks to maximize the number of culpable 
wrongdoers punished.”). 
 36. Id. at 146-47 ([Deontological retributivism] demands the punishment of each and every 
guilty person even if doing so foregoes greater opportunities to punish the guilty. In contrast, 
consequentialist retributivism seeks to maximize the number of culpable wrongdoers punished even if 
doing so foregoes punishment of some culpable wrongdoers.”). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 123 (presenting the prosecutor’s dilemma). 
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prosecutor will successfully convict the two.40 However, by offering 
immunity to the one, the prosecutor is forgoing the opportunity to 
punish a guilty person.41 If the prosecutor is a deontological retributivist, 
he will not offer immunity. An offer of immunity violates his duties to 
treat each person as an individual–without regard to others–and to 
punish all guilty persons.42 A consequentialist retributivist, on the other 
hand, would offer immunity to that guilty person in order to punish the 
two.43 The consequentialist retributivist will view this offer of immunity 
as having good, desert-based consequences.44 By sacrificing one desert-
based punishment, he will secure two desert-based punishments. The net 
gain of desert-based punishments justifies forgoing the punishment of 
the particular guilty actor. 
As demonstrated by the bargain justice dilemma,45 consequentialist 
retributivists are motivated by a desire to maximize desert. 
Consequentialist retributivists seek a net gain of desert-giving. In other 
words, forgoing punishment of one to convict and punish two is justified 
under consequentialist retributivism, but the same cannot be said of 
forgoing punishment of one to punish one. In the conjoined twins 
problem, Innocent Twin deserves no punishment and Guilty Twin 
deserves punishment. The consequentialist retributivist is only justified 
in deviating from stricter versions of retributivism if a net gain in desert-
giving can be achieved from the deviation. Regardless of whether the 
consequentialist retributivist punishes or forgoes punishment, the result 
is a net-zero. Giving either twin his just desert necessarily results in a 
missed opportunity to give the other his just desert. Because there is no 
possibility for a net gain when only two persons with opposing deserts 
are involved, the necessary condition for deviating from the retributive 
framework is unsatisfied. Therefore, the consequentialist retributivist 
must rely on the baseline version of retributivism. Retributivism cannot 
resolve the conjoined twins problem because either result–punishing 
Guilty Twin or refusing to punish Innocent Twin–necessarily violates 
one of retributivism’s core duties with respect to the other twin. Because 
 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 118-22; See George Fletcher, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 36-37 (1998) (“It is 
patently unjust, in Kant’s view, to punish some offenders less because they are willing to cooperate in 
some way with the state.”). 
 43. See Christopher, Dilemma, supra note 13, at 149 (“Since punishing the Two maximizes the 
intrinsic good of retributive punishment, consequentialist retributivism provides a clear basis to accept 
the offer.”). 
 44. Id. at 147-48 (“Although both [deontological and consequentialist] versions of retributivism 
value a culpable wrongdoer receiving his just deserts, only consequentialist retributivism seeks to 
maximize generation of that intrinsic good.”). 
 45. See generally Christopher, Dilemma, supra note 13. 
11
Deitch: Retributivist Theories’ Conjoined Twins Problems
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018
150 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87 
there is no net gain of desert-giving that could be achieved through 
either result, consequentialist retributivists cannot rely on their narrow 
incorporation of consequentialism to resolve the conjoined twins 
problem. Thus, consequentialist retributivism cannot resolve the 
conjoined twins problem any better than pure retributivism. 
C. Threshold 
Threshold retributivism is the second version of retributivism that 
tempers its retributivist principles with consequentialism. Threshold 
retributivism, more commonly termed “threshold deontology,”46 
maintains the basic principles of deontological retributivism–that is, a 
morality-based and agent-based view of desert and punishment.47 
However, threshold retributivists limit the absolutist, Kantian view that 
“though the heavens may fall, justice shall be done.”48 Under some 
circumstances, if the consequences are exceptionally bad, punishment of 
an innocent may be justified.49 Critics of threshold retributivism claim 
that it collapses into consequentialism by considering the consequences 
in its analysis of whether punishment is justified.50 Threshold 
retributivists combat this charge by arguing “[t]here is a very high 
threshold of bad consequences that must be threatened before something 
as awful as torturing an innocent person can be justified. Almost all real-
life decisions . . . will not reach that threshold of horrendous 
consequences justifying torture of the innocent.”51 Other critics demand 
to know why the consequences of punishment only matter at and above 
the threshold.52 Threshold retributivists reply that the consequences 
 
 46. MOORE, supra note 3, at 719-24 (discussing the theory as “threshold deontology” throughout 
this section); Christopher, Dilemma, supra note 13, at 153 (“Threshold retributivism is merely threshold 
deontology applied to the punishment arena.”). 
 47. See MOORE, supra note 3, at 722 (describing threshold retributivism as “agent-relative views 
of morality with a threshold” and claiming that, “short of such a threshold, the agent-relative view [of 
deontological retributivism] will operate as absolutely as absolutism.”). 
 48. Id. at 719 (“[A]bsolutism is often attributed to Kant, who held that though the heavens may 
fall, justice must be done. Despite my non-consequentialist views on morality, I cannot accept the 
Kantian line.”). 
 49. Id. at 719 (For threshold retributivists, “It is just not true that one should allow a nuclear war 
rather than killing or torturing an innocent person. It is not even true that one should allow the 
destruction of a sizable city by a terrorist nuclear device rather than kill or torture an innocent person. 
To prevent such extraordinary harms extreme actions seem to me to be justified.”). 
 50. See Amartya Sen, Rights and Agency, 11 PHIL. AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 3, 7 n. 8 (1982) (“Such 
a threshold-based ‘constraint’ system must rest ultimately on consequentialist analysis, comparing one 
set of consequences . . . with another . . . and its distinguishing feature will be the particular form of the 
consequence-evaluation function.”) (emphasis in original). 
 51. MOORE, supra note 3, at 722. 
 52. See Nancy (Ann) Davis, Contemporary Deontology, in A COMPANION ON ETHICS 205, 216 
(Peter Singer ed., 1991) (“The addition of the ‘catastrophe clause’ is particularly problematic. Why do 
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“always count,” but they are insufficient to outweigh deontological 
concerns until a threshold is met.53 Thus, threshold retributivists are 
essentially deontological retributivists who are willing to admit that 
sometimes there are good reasons to violate their core duties, either by 
punishing an innocent or by forgoing punishment of a guilty person.54 
Short of a consequence as catastrophic as a nuclear war resulting from 
honoring their duties, threshold retributivists rely on the principles of 
deontological and pure retributivism.55 
A threshold retributivist would naturally start from the same position 
as a deontological retributivist in analyzing the conjoined twins 
problem. Unless a threshold-eligible catastrophe is identified, 
deontological retributivism guides the threshold retributivist.56 After 
realizing that neither punishing Guilty Twin nor forgoing punishment of 
Innocent Twin can satisfy the core retributive duties, the threshold 
retributivist might be tempted to open his escape hatch and claim that 
the consequences of either decision are so deleterious that the other 
option is preferable. If he honors his positive duty and punishes Guilty 
Twin, the bad consequence would be the infliction of suffering upon 
Innocent Twin. If he honors his negative duty and forgoes punishing the 
Innocent Twin, then he would release a known murderer into society. 
Thus, the threshold retributivist might argue that the suffering of 
Innocent Twin is so bad that Guilty Twin must go free. He could 
alternatively argue that the consequence of letting a known murderer go 
free is so horrible for society that Innocent Twin may justifiably be 
punished. However, neither of these feared consequences, flowing from 
honoring either duty, rises to the level of catastrophe that threshold 
retributivism contemplates. Threshold retributivists are careful to limit 
the availability of the escape hatch to include only situations where there 
is “a very high threshold of bad consequences that must be 
 
the effects of our acts on others’ weal and woe acquire relevance only at the ‘catastrophic’ level?”). 
 53. MOORE, supra note 3, at 723 (“[F]or a threshold deontologist consequences always ‘count.’ 
For behavior violating deontological constraints, however, until the threshold is reached, the 
[consequentialist principle] is outweighed by moral principles.”). 
 54. Id. at 723 (“As the consequences grow more and more severe, the consequentialist principle 
becomes of greater weight as applied to this situation, until at some point (the threshold) the 
consequentialist principle outweighs competing principles of morality.”); For a critical perspective, see 
Davis, supra note 51, at 215-16 (criticizing threshold retributivism and summarizing the theory as, 
“[A]llowing that we may violate deontological constraints in dire circumstances saves deontological 
views from the appearance of fanaticism, and thus confers greater normative plausibility on them.”). 
 55. See Christopher, Dilemma, supra note 13, at 156 (“Specific examples satisfying the threshold 
include the demise of a nation, if the heavens will in fact fall, nuclear war . . . the destruction of a 
sizeable city by a terrorist nuclear device.”). 
 56. Id. at 157 (explaining that, because the necessary threshold is not reached in the prosecutor’s 
dilemma, threshold retributivists are bound by retributivism).  
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threatened.”57 Short of that threshold, as with most real-life scenarios, 
“the agent-relative view . . . will operate as absolutely as absolutism in 
its ban on torturing the innocent.”58  
The conjoined twins problem is a real-life scenario,59 but it is a rare 
and exceptional problem. The frequency with which a problem occurs 
should have no bearing over whether a consequence meets the threshold; 
instead the focus should be on the magnitude of the bad consequence. 
However, even assuming arguendo that the rarity of the conjoined twins 
problem matters, the threshold retributivist still encounters difficulty in 
arguing that the negative consequence of Innocent Twin’s suffering or of 
Guilty Twin’s presence in society rise to the same high threshold as a 
nuclear war.60 Evident in the examples of accepted thresholds–the 
demise of a nation, the fall of the heavens, the destruction of a sizable 
city, or the eruption of a nuclear war61–is an assumption that the bad 
consequence must be certain to occur and certain to affect a large 
population.62  
If the threshold retributivist draws the line by accepting the suffering 
of one innocent as a reason not to punish one guilty, then he is left with 
no retributive theory of punishment at all. Instead, he collapses into 
consequentialism and loses his defense that the threshold must be “very 
high.” For example, if the threshold retributivist claims that releasing a 
known murderer into society satisfies the threshold, he would punish the 
twins. To reach this result, the threshold retributivist must argue that the 
consequences of forgoing punishment of a guilty person–without a 
showing that the guilty person will commit acts that are tantamount to 
the destruction of a sizeable city–can be used to justify the punishment 
of an innocent. This line of reasoning is flawed because one could apply 
it more broadly to justify nearly all punishment. Put simply, if the fear 
of releasing a guilty person on society can justify the intentional 
punishment of an innocent, then the fear of a person committing any 
future crime could justify the intentional punishment of innocents.  
 
 57. MOORE, supra note 3, at 722. 
 58. Id. at 722. 
 59. See Deitch, supra note 1, at 964 (“[C]onjoined twins have appeared as defendants in at least 
four American courts.”). 
 60. The analysis could change if Guilty Twin were released on this charge and proceeded to go 
on a killing spree. When he is prosecuted for the subsequent crimes and society’s fears are realized and 
there is reason to believe that he will continue to wreak havoc, perhaps the punishment could then be 
justified under threshold retributivism. At that point, there is a possible argument that the consequences 
of refusing to punish Innocent Twin are tantamount to nuclear war.  
 61. See Christopher, Dilemma, supra note 13, at 156 (“Specific examples satisfying the threshold 
include the demise of a nation, if the heavens will in fact fall, nuclear war . . . the destruction of a 
sizeable city by a terrorist nuclear device.”). 
 62. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 3, at 719 (expressing uncertainty about whether the destruction 
“of a lifeboat or building full of people” rises to the threshold).  
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This one-to-one ratio erring on the side of punishment could 
ultimately justify a system with a high rate of false convictions. 
Punishing more–for example, through adopting a lower standard of 
proof than beyond reasonable doubt–could be justified if innocents 
suffering is deemed necessary to avoid the prospective release of guilty 
persons. In addition to the problems of either favoring the positive duty 
over the negative or collapsing into consequentialism, this solution also 
rejects the Blackstone Principle, which Michael Moore indicates is a 
ratio that is compatible with his theory of threshold retributivism.63  
Most threshold retributivists would likely concede that the feared 
consequences of honoring either duty do not meet the requisite threshold 
to justifiably violate a retributive duty.64 Where the threshold is unmet, 
threshold retributivists may not use consequentialist considerations to 
resolve the problem.65 Without license to use the escape hatch 
(consequentialism), the threshold retributivist is bound by deontological 
retributivism. As shown above, deontological retributivism provides no 
resolution for the conjoined twins problem. Thus, threshold 
retributivism fails to satisfactorily resolve the conjoined twins problem. 
D. Negative/Weak 
Scholars sometimes use the terms “negative” and “weak” 
retributivism interchangeably.66 Negative or weak retributivism 
addresses two concerns in justifying punishment. The first is an inquiry 
into whether a particular actor may be punished. Negative retributivism 
responds by only adopting retributivism’s negative duty to never punish 
innocent persons.67 The second concern asks how much punishment is 
 
 63. Id. at 157, n.11 (“The retributivist might adopt a principle of symmetry here – the guilty 
going unpunished is exactly the same magnitude of evil as the innocent being punished – and design his 
institutions accordingly. Or the retributivist might share the common view (that the second is a greater 
evil than the first) and design institutions so that ‘ten guilty persons go unpunished in order that one 
innocent not be punished.’”); See generally WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *352. (“[I]t is 
better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.”). 
 64. See Christopher, Dilemma, supra note 13, at 156-57 (arguing that the threshold is not met for 
threshold retributivists where “the torture of one innocent [prevents] the torture of the two [guilty 
offenders].”). 
 65. Id. at 157 (“Since a necessary condition for threshold retributivism is not met (the threshold), 
threshold retributivism fails to avoid the Prosecutor’s Dilemma.”). 
 66. See, e.g., Christopher, Deterring, supra note 3, at 865 (“Weak, or negative, retributivism 
merely requires that a wrongdoer not be punished more than she deserves.”); Id. at 865.n.117 (“The term 
‘weak retributivism’ may stem from Hart . . . The term ‘negative retributivism’ may derive from 
Mackie.”) (citing H.L.A. Hart, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 
233 (Oxford Univ. Press 1992) (1968) and J.L. Mackie, Morality and Retributive Emotions, CRIM. JUST. 
ETHICS 3, 4 (1983)).  
 67. See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, Hating Criminals: How Can Something that Feels So Good Be 
Wrong?, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1448, 1451 (1990) (book review) (“Negative retributivism . . . holds only 
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justified. Negative retributivism sets “an upper limit” on the permissible 
degree of punishment for guilty persons.68 The following sub-sections 
treat these issues separately to illustrate the discrete issues the conjoined 
twins problem presents for negative retributivists.  
1. Negative/Weak: May We Punish This Actor? 
Negative retributivism merely holds that “it is morally wrong to 
punish an innocent person.”69 This may best be described in relation to 
pure retributivism. Recall that pure retributivism holds two duties–a 
positive duty to punish all who are guilty and a negative duty to never 
punish an innocent.70 Negative retributivism may be viewed as a version 
of retributivism that adopts only the negative duty.71 Another way to 
describe negative retributivism in relation to pure retributivism is to say 
that, where proponents of pure and deontological versions of 
retributivism hold criminal desert as a sufficient condition for 
punishment, negative retributivists claim only that desert is a “necessary 
condition of justified punishment.”72 
Proponents of this version of retributivism argue that refusing to 
punish innocents is sufficient to “avoid the evil” of consequentialism.73 
 
that it is morally wrong to punish an innocent person even if society might benefit from the action, i.e., 
the retributive principle of just deserts is a necessary condition of punishment.”); J.L. Mackie, Morality 
and Retributive Emotions, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3, 4 (1983) (defining negative retributivism as “the 
principle that one who is not guilty must not be punished”); JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, RETRIBUTIVISM AND 
THE STATE’S INTEREST IN PUNISHMENT 156, 159 (1970) (arguing that only the negative duty to not 
punish the innocent is necessary to avoid the evil– that is, taking rights of one person for a social good – 
that utilitarianism seems to invite) [hereinafter MURPHY, STATE]; R.A. Duff, Penal Communications: 
Recent Work in the Philosophy of Punishment, 20 CRIME & JUSTICE 1, 7 (1996) (“[A] ‘negative’ 
retributivism that forbids the punishment of the innocent (and perhaps also the excessive punishment of 
the guilty) has been more common . . . than a ‘positive’ retributivism that demands the punishment of 
the guilty, to the extent that they deserve.”) (emphasis in original). 
 68. Christopher, Deterring, supra note 3, at 869 (“Weak, or negative, retributivism merely 
requires that a wrongdoer not be punished more than she deserves.”); R.A. Duff, Penal 
Communications: Recent Work in the Philosophy of Punishment, 20 CRIME & JUSTICE 1, 7 (1996) (“[A] 
‘negative’ retributivism that forbids the punishment of the innocent (and perhaps also the excessive 
punishment of the guilty) has been more common . . . than a ‘positive’ retributivism that demands the 
punishment of the guilty, to the extent that they deserve.”) (emphasis in original). 
 69. Dressler, supra note 66, at 1451. 
 70. See MOORE, supra note 3. 
 71. See J.L. Mackie, Morality and Retributive Emotions, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3, 4 (1983) 
(defining negative retributivism as “the principle that one who is not guilty must not be punished”); 
MURPHY, STATE, supra note 67, at 159 (arguing that only the negative duty to not punish the innocent is 
necessary to avoid the evil– that is, taking rights of one person for a social good – that utilitarianism 
seems to invite). 
 72. Duff, supra note 67, at 7 (emphasis in original); See also Dressler, supra note 66. 
 73. MURPHY, STATE, supra note 66, at 159 (arguing that only the negative duty to not punish the 
innocent is necessary to avoid the evil – that is, taking rights of one person for a social good – that 
utilitarianism seems to invite). 
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Retributivists frequently criticize consequentialism for its apparent 
ability to justify any heinous abridgement of an individual’s rights, so 
long as the consequentialist can articulate a societal good derived from 
that abridgement.74 By carving out a specific prohibition on punishing 
innocent persons and by refusing to adopt a requirement to punish guilty 
persons, negative retributivism offers arguably the least controversial, 
least restrictive theory of punishment. Most would agree that knowingly 
punishing innocent persons is morally wrong75 and would likely feel less 
strongly about the morality of declining to punish a guilty person. 
Critics of negative retributivism point out that it fails to qualify as a 
justification of punishment because it provides no affirmative reason to 
punish wrongdoers.76 Negative retributivism articulates no guidelines 
for when punishment is justified. Instead, it merely states when 
punishment is unjustified by prohibiting punishment of innocents. If the 
purpose of justifying punishment is to set the terms for when it is 
morally acceptable to impose suffering on another,77 then any theory of 
 
 74. See HART, supra note 66, at 5-6 (claiming that the argument that consequentialism can 
justify punishing the innocent is the “stock retributive argument” against consequentialism); 
Greenawalt, supra note 12, at 1341 (“[T]he most damaging aspect of the [retributivist] attack is that 
[consequentialism] admits the possibility of justified punishment of the innocent”); Christopher, 
Deterring, supra note 3, at 870 (“Retributivists’ principal, and most devastating, criticism of 
consequentialist theories of punishment is that they justify punishment of the innocent.”). 
 75. See generally WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *352. (“It is better that ten guilty 
persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.”); Keith A. Findley, Toward a New Paradigm of Criminal 
Justice: How the Innocence Movement Merges Crime Control and Due Process, 41 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 
133, 136 (2008) (“Wrongful conviction of the innocent is a greater constitutional wrong than is failure 
to convict the guilty.”); D. Michael Risinger, Essay, Tragic Consequences of Deadly Dilemmas: A 
Response to Allen and Laudan, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 991, 1002 (2010) (“[F]or any given crime, an 
error that convicts an innocent person is much worse morally than an error that acquits a guilty 
person.”); Hon. J. Harvie Wilkinson, Essay, In Defense of American Criminal Justice, 67 VAND. L. REV. 
1099, 1109 (2014) (“[The Blackstone Ratio] is about balancing the twin aims of our criminal justice 
system: How do we punish as many of the deserving guilty as possible while ensnaring as few of the 
innocents as possible?”); Daniel Epps, The Consequences of Error in Criminal Justice, 128 HARV. L. 
REV. 1065, 1068 (2015) (defining the Blackstone principle as: “[I]n distributing criminal punishment, 
we must strongly err in favor of false negatives (failures to convict the guilty) in order to minimize false 
positives (convictions of the innocent), even if doing so significantly decreases overall accuracy.”); see 
also Genesis 18:23-33 (Abraham asks God if He will destroy Sodom if fifty, forty-five, forty, thirty, 
twenty, or even ten righteous people can be found in the city. God replies, “For the sake of ten, I will not 
destroy it.”). 
 76. See David Dolinko, Some Thoughts About Retributivism, 101 ETHICS 537, 539-44 (1991) 
(Negative retributivism provides no reason to punish a wrongdoer at all and does not serve as a 
complete theory of punishment.); R.A. Duff, Penal Communications: Recent Work in the Philosophy of 
Punishment, 20 CRIME & JUSTICE 1, 7 (1996) (“A merely negative retributivism, however, clearly 
provides no complete justification of punishment: for it tells us that we may punish the guilty (their 
punishment is not unjust), but not that or why we should punish them.”). 
 77. See Cragg, supra note 24, at 707 (“One of the basic rules of civilized society is that 
deliberately inflicting pain and suffering on others always requires careful justification.”); Greenawalt, 
supra note 12, at 1336 (outlining the three main concerns in justifying punishment as: (1) “why (and 
whether) the social institution of punishment is warranted,” (2) what are “the necessary conditions for 
punishment in particular cases [,]” and (3) what “degree and severity . . . is appropriate for particular 
17
Deitch: Retributivist Theories’ Conjoined Twins Problems
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018
156 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87 
punishment must articulate those terms. Put another way, defining 
something by what it is not offers no definition at all; likewise, a 
justification of punishment that fails to justify punishment is no 
justification of punishment.  
Although negative retributivism might not support a penal system at 
all, one can conceive of a version of negative retributivism that adopts 
the negative duty to never punish an innocent as obligatory and adopts 
the positive duty to punish the guilty as merely permissive (and thus not 
as a technical “duty”).78 If a negative retributivist supports a penal 
system under these guidelines, he is vulnerable to the same criticisms 
leveled against pure retributivism with respect to its failure to satisfy its 
negative duty.79 In other words, every argument claiming pure 
retributivism violates its negative duty by supporting or endorsing a 
system that inevitably produces erroneous guilty verdicts80 and causes 
the offenders’ innocent loved ones to suffer81 also applies to this 
conceptual version of negative retributivism.  
Negative retributivism appears well-suited to resolve the conjoined 
twins problem. By only adopting the negative duty, a negative 
retributivist is unplagued by a need to honor the competing positive 
duty. Guilty Twin deserves punishment, but the negative retributivist 
bears no obligation to punish him. Innocent Twin deserves no 
punishment, and the negative retributivist is obligated to set him free. 
The solution for the negative retributivist seems clear: satisfy the only 
obligatory duty by forgoing punishment of the twins. 
Because the negative retributivist need not choose between competing 
duties, the conjoined twins problem does not create a moral dilemma82 
 
offenses and offenders.”). 
 78. No scholar has yet to endorse such a theory, but it is logically possible and will be considered 
in this Article for the sake of comprehensiveness. Arguably the theory presented here is part of H.L.A. 
Hart’s theory discussed in Part II E. 
 79. See generally Deitch, supra note 1, at 961 (discussing criticisms that retributivists violate 
their negative duty when they endorse a system of punishment).  
 80. See Richard O. Lempert, Desert and Deterrence: An Assessment of the Moral Bases of the 
Case for Capital Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1177, 1182 (1981) (“Retributivism is also haunted by 
those executions of the innocent which inevitably occur if the death penalty is allowed.”); Christopher, 
Deterring, supra note 3, at 900 (“Retributivists readily acknowledge that innocents will mistakenly be 
punished, but dismiss it as an insignificant problem. Retributivists claim that though they know that 
some unknown innocents will be mistakenly punished, no particular, identifiable innocent is 
intentionally punished under retributivism.”). 
 81. See Christopher, Deterring, supra note 3, at 879 (“Another way that retributivism is claimed 
to justify intentional punishment of the innocent is that infliction of punishment on a guilty offender will 
most likely inflict pain and suffering on his or her friends and family who are innocent of the offense.”); 
Richard O. Lempert, Desert and Deterrence: An Assessment of the Moral Bases of the Case for Capital 
Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1177, 1182 (1981) (“Retributivism is also haunted by those executions of 
the innocent which inevitably occur if the death penalty is allowed.”). 
 82. See Christopher, Dilemma, supra note 13, at 137-42 (defining moral dilemma generally as a 
situation in which an actor must select an option that violates his principles in order to satisfy another 
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for the negative retributivist. However, the conjoined twins problem 
illustrates and illuminates negative retributivism’s other flaws. By 
releasing Guilty Twin based upon the absence of a duty to punish him, 
the negative retributivist offers Guilty Twin a biologically built-in, 
limitless defense to any crime. As long as Innocent Twin remains 
innocent through Guilty Twin’s commission of offenses, Guilty Twin 
never receives his just desert. Notice though that Innocent Twin’s 
innocence is probably irrelevant with respect to negative retributivism’s 
terms. By holding only the negative duty to forgo punishing innocents, 
the negative retributivist may permissibly never punish anyone, 
regardless of the person’s guilt or physical connectedness to another.  
 Retributivism, at its core, is a desert-based justification for 
punishment. If this version of retributivism can justify indefinitely 
forgoing punishment of a known murderer for no apparent reasons with 
no internal qualms, then it cannot truly be a version of retributivism. It 
neither issues punishment in accordance with desert nor justifies 
punishment at all. Negative retributivism can, at best, be viewed as a 
limitation on punishment. A theory of punishment that knowingly 
allows a person who is guilty of a serious offense to go unpunished 
simply fails as a desert-based justification of punishment. Because 
negative retributivists can easily resolve the conjoined twins problem by 
forgoing punishment, and because the physical nature of the twins plays 
no role in the analysis, negative retributivism is neither retributive nor a 
justification of punishment. 
2. Negative/Weak: To What Degree May We Punish This Actor? 
The above description of negative retributivism addresses the 
question of whether punishment is justified (though, as explained, it 
only addresses the question of whether punishment is prohibited – and 
may feasibly permit always declining to punish). Another explanation of 
negative retributivism deals with the degree of permissible punishment 
for a guilty actor.83 Here, negative retributivism “sets the upper limit” on 
the amount of punishment permissibly imposed upon a guilty offender.84  
The degree-based form of negative retributivism establishes a cap on 
the amount of punishment that may justifiably be imposed upon a 
person.85 A guilty actor must not be punished more than he deserves.86 
 
principle, and discussing the various types of moral dilemmas on a spectrum from broad to narrow). 
 83. See Christopher, Deterring, supra note 3, at 869 (discussing Hart’s mixed theory’s 
assignment of amount of punishment and explaining, “The negative retributivism component [of Hart’s 
theory] sets the upper limit . . . on how much punishment to impose.”). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id.  
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Naturally, this also forbids punishing an innocent person, because an 
innocent deserves precisely no punishment. Like each version of 
retributivism discussed thus far, which prohibit punishment of 
innocents, punishment of an innocent is also categorically prohibited 
under this version.  
All versions of retributivism hold that punishing an innocent is 
unjustified,87 but retributivists disagree about how much punishment a 
guilty person deserves.88 Pure retributivism, and any version of 
retributivism adopting the strong, positive duty, holds that guilty persons 
must be punished to the fullest extent of their desert.89 Negative 
retributivists do not adopt this requirement. 
Degree-based negative retributivism is generally used as a guiding 
principle in mixed theories and is not employed as a stand-alone 
justification of punishment. For this reason, it is not subject to every 
criticism leveled against the form of negative retributivism that seeks to 
answer the question of whether punishment is permissible.90 However, 
 
 86. Id. at 865 (“Weak, or negative, retributivism merely requires that a wrongdoer must not be 
punished more than she deserves.”). 
 87. See, e.g., Talia Fisher, Conviction Without Conviction, 96 MINN. L. REV. 833, 875-76 (2012) 
(“Retributivists are concurrently committed to two fundamental principles: punishing the guilty and not 
punishing the innocent. Deviation from either one of these outcomes is considered a departure from the 
principles of just desert.”); But see infra Part II. C. (explaining that threshold retributivists admit that, 
under extreme circumstances, intentional punishment of the innocent may be justified). 
 88. See Larry Alexander, You Got What You Deserved, 7 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 309, 315 (2012) 
(“The ‘how much is deserved’ question has many facets, some of which have been copiously debated.”). 
Common views of proportionality among retributivists are Kant’s lex talionis theory, Hegel’s annulment 
theory, and Jean Hampton’s expressive theory. KANT, supra note 3, at 169 (equality between the crime 
and the punishment, which is also called lex talionis or “an eye for an eye”); HEGEL, supra note 22, at 
127 (establishing the principle that the offender’s suffering should be proportionate to the value of the 
crime and that “what the criminal has done should also happen to him.”); Jean Hampton, Correcting 
Wrongs Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1686 (1992) (setting 
forth the “expressive” theory of retribution and advocating for equality between the suffering of the 
criminal and the suffering he caused the victim, which demands that “a response to a wrong that is 
intended to vindicate the value of the victim denied by the wrongdoer’s action through the construction 
of an event that not only repudiates the action’s message of superiority over the victim but does so in a 
way that confirms them as equal by virtue of their humanity.”); Adam J. Kolber, The Comparative 
Nature of Punishment, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1565, 1595 (2009) (“Moreover, if we want to punish 
proportionally, then we have to calibrate punishments to reflect the suffering that offenders actually 
experience or are expected to experience as a result of being punished.”). 
 89. See KANT, supra note 3, at 169 (punishment requires lex talionis, equality between the crime 
and the punishment); HEGEL, supra note 22, at 127 (“[W]hat the criminal has done should also happen 
to him.”); Christopher, Deterring, supra note 3, at 865-66 (“[S]trong, or positive, retributivism requires 
that a wrongdoer be punished to the fullest extent of his just deserts.”).  
 90. Stated differently, the form of negative retributivism that attempts to answer the question of 
whether punishment is permissible can be criticized for failing to provide any reason to answer that 
question in the affirmative. By contrast, the desert-based form of retributivism does not attempt to 
justify punishment or explain when punishment is unjustified. It merely addresses the question of how 
much punishment a person should get after using some other theory to determine that punishment is 
justified. 
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degree-based negative retributivism is vulnerable to some criticisms 
leveled against the other form of negative retributivism, including the 
inevitability of a zero-error rate in any criminal justice system and the 
suffering of the guilty actor’s innocent loved ones. For the latter 
criticism, a degree-based negative retributivist could conceivably reply 
that considering the suffering of others in calculating the appropriate 
degree of punishment for the guilty actor is permissible. Given the 
limited nature of the question that degree-based negative retributivism 
answers, there is nothing in the theory that addresses whether only the 
guilty actor may be considered in the degree calculation. Because 
degree-based negative retributivism is folded into other theories, it could 
conceivably be combined with a version of consequentialism that 
accounts for a guilty actor’s familial status or role in the community.  
Additionally, degree-based negative retributivism receives its own 
unique, proportionality-based criticisms. For example, critics have 
argued that mixed theorists who use degree-based negative retributivism 
are “disproportionately lenient” because they decline to “[justify] the 
punishment of guilty wrongdoers to the fullest extent of their just 
deserts.”91 A degree-based negative retributivist might reply that it is 
morally acceptable to fail to punish to the fullest extent permitted 
because preventing excessive punishment and refusing to punish 
innocents is all that is morally required to avoid evil.92  
Turning to the conjoined twins problem, assume the negative 
retributivist punishes. He will then need to determine the degree of 
punishment. Guilty Twin deserves punishment to a high degree, because 
he is guilty of a murder. However, Innocent Twin deserves no 
punishment at all, because he is innocent. The negative retributivist may 
not impose punishment in excess of the person’s desert. One person–
Guilty Twin–deserves a high level of punishment and the other–Innocent 
Twin–deserves absolutely none, but any punishment will necessarily be 
inflicted equally upon both. There is no way to reconcile the problem 
presented. A negative retributivist may punish Guilty Twin to any degree 
up to what he deserves, so the negative retributivist might impose a 
punishment less than the fullest extent permissible. Whatever 
punishment the negative retributivist inflicts upon Guilty Twin will also 
be imposed upon Innocent Twin. With respect to Innocent Twin, no 
amount of punishment can be justified under negative retributivism 
because any punishment exceeds his desert. Thus, any punishment of 
Guilty Twin would violate negative retributivism’s duty to Innocent 
 
 91. Christopher, Deterring, supra note 3, at 869. 
 92. See MURPHY, STATE, supra note 66, at 159 (arguing that only the negative duty to not punish 
the innocent is necessary to avoid the evil– that is, taking rights of one person for a social good – that 
utilitarianism seems to invite). 
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Twin. 
Now, assume the negative retributivist forgoes punishing Guilty Twin. 
Failure to punish is permissible with respect to both Innocent Twin and 
Guilty Twin. The problem here is largely the same as the problem in the 
preceding section. Failure to punish Guilty Twin is permissible under the 
theory, but it is also extraordinarily lenient. Releasing a known murderer 
is inconsistent with retributivism, a desert-based justification of 
punishment. Apart from its inability to adhere to the retributive 
framework, negative retributivism’s release of a known murderer for no 
apparent reason demonstrates its failure to serve as a justification of 
punishment at all. 
E. Victim-Conscious 
Some retributivists argue that victims should play a role in justifying 
retributive punishment.93 Whereas consequentialists might consider both 
actual and putative victims in justifying punishment,94 victim-conscious 
retributivists–as advocates of a backward-looking theory of 
punishment95–carefully limit their consideration only to actual victims 
of the specific past crime for which the offender is guilty.96  
Victim-conscious retributivist, George Fletcher, analogizes his theory 
 
 93. See Fletcher, Victims, supra note 6, at 63 (“[T]he interests of victims may be properly 
integrated into the theory of retributive punishment.”).  
This traces back to Aristotle’s Theory of Justice, wherein Aristotle argues for justice as rectification: 
“It makes no difference whether a decent man has defrauded a bad man or vice 
versa, or whether it was a decent or bad man who committed adultery. The only 
difference the law considers is that brought about by the damage: it treats the 
parties as equal and asks only whether one has done and the other has suffered 
wrong, and whether one has done and the other has suffered damage. As the 
unjust in this sense is inequality, the judge tries to restore equilibrium. When one 
man has inflicted and another received a wound, or when one man has killed and 
the other has been killed, the doing and suffering are unequally divided; by 
inflicting a loss on the offender, the judge tries to take away his gain and restore 
the equilibrium.”  
ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 120-21 (Martin Oswalt trans., 1969) (350 B.C.E.).Fletcher, Victims, 
supra note 6 at 58 (“Seeking to bring about equality between victim and offender is a classic concern in 
Aristotle’s theory of justice.”). 
 94. See Adam J. MacLeod, All for One: A Review of Victim-Centric Justifications for Criminal 
Punishment, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 31, 37 (2008) (“[Peter Singer, a consequentialist] does not 
substitute traditional consequentialist concerns . . . for guilty usurpation of society’s legal standards as a 
rationale or punishment. He instead uses impediment to the putative victim’s legal interest.”) (citing 
Peter Singer, Pulling Back the Curtain on the Mercy Killing of Newborns, L.A. TIMES Mar. 11, 2005, at 
B13). 
 95. See, e.g., Cragg, supra note 24, at 707 (“[B]ackward-looking justifications see punishment as 
a response to moral wrongdoing.”) 
 96. See Fletcher, Victims, supra note 6, at 55 (“First, the victims that are relevant for our 
purposes are the actual victims not the potential victims of future crimes.”). 
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to Hegel’s norm vindication theory.97 Hegel argues that retributive 
punishment seeks to restore the norm by defeating the aggressor 
proportionate to the amount in which he disrupted the norm.98 He 
famously characterizes punishment as “the negation of the negation.”99 
For Hegel, the norm is defended by the punishment,100 but for Fletcher, 
“the ‘victim’ takes the place of the ‘norm’ in the structure of the 
argument.”101 While Hegel advocates for punishment that negates the 
negation the wrongdoer created for the state generally, Fletcher views 
the aim of punishment as restoring equality between the wrongdoer and 
the victim.102 When a wrongdoer does wrong, according to Hegel, he 
gains an unfair advantage over society that must be corrected to restore 
equality. For Fletcher, when a wrongdoer does wrong, he gains unfair 
dominance over his victim and equality must be restored.103 Fletcher 
incorporates victims into both the corrective104 and the distributive105 
dimensions of punishment.106 The corrective dimension is satisfied when 
an offender is punished and the punishment “communicat[es] to the 
victim a concern for his or her antecedent suffering.”107 Through victim-
conscious corrective justice, the state punishes offenders to express 
solidarity with victims. The distributive dimension is satisfied when 
offenders are punished equally with respect to one another.108  
 
 97. Id. at 58 (“This victim-based argument does not differ, in principle, from the Hegelian 
argument that punishment serves to vindicate the norms against those who have sought to defeat it. The 
only difference is that the ‘victim’ takes the place of the ‘norm’ in the structure of the argument.”); 
Hampton, supra note 88, at 1694 (“As Hegel appreciated, the modern state is the citizenry’s moral 
representative; in the face of pluralism and religious controversy, it is the only institutional voice of the 
community’s shared moral values.”). 
 98. See HEGEL, supra note 22, at 127 (“[W]hat the criminal has done should also happen to 
him.”). 
 99. Id. at 123 (“[P]unishment is merely the negation of the negation.”). 
 100. See Fletcher, Victims, supra note 6, at 58 (“In the traditional Hegelian view, the norm is 
defended and the aggressor symbolically defeated.”). 
 101. Id.  
 102. Id. (“[T]he position and dignity of the victim are rendered equal relative to the aggressor.”). 
 103. Id. (“The function of arrest, trial, and punishment is to overcome this dominance and 
reestablish the equality of victim and offender.”). 
 104. Corrective justice can be characterized as equality between the victim and the offender. Id. at 
58 (“Corrective justice seeks the equality that existed between the victim and offender prior to the 
wrongful act.”). 
 105. Distributive justice can be characterized as equality between and among like offenders. Id. at 
58 (“The distributive dimension of punishments consists in the legal imperative to punish all offenders 
equally. The evil of punishment should be distributed fairly, with each offender receiving his just 
deserts.”); Cf. MOORE, supra note 3, at 87-88 (“Punishment of the guilty is thus for the retributivist an 
intrinsic good, not the merely instrumental good that it may be to the utilitarian or rehabilitative 
theorist.”). 
 106. See Fletcher, Victims, supra note 6, at 58 (“Retributive justice combines features of both 
corrective and distributive justice.”). 
 107. Id. at 58. 
 108. Id. (“The distributive dimension of punishment consists in the legal imperative to punish all 
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The obvious criticism of victim-conscious retribution is that it fails to 
justify punishment for crimes in which there is no identifiable victim.109 
In response, Fletcher “fills the gap”110 by drawing on the retributive, 
Kantian111 desire to avoid “the evil of impunidad–the phenomenon of 
offenders getting away with their crimes.”112 By adding this component 
to his theory, Fletcher limits his victim-conscious rationale to justify 
crimes in which there is an identifiable victim, but maintains the 
Hegelian rationale to justify crimes that merely unfairly elevate the 
wrongdoer above society. Although Fletcher has attempted to justify his 
victim-conscious approach using Hegel’s and Kant’s retributive 
reasoning, critics nevertheless maintain that the underlying “power-
imbalance calculus” is inherently consequentialist.113 By justifying 
punishment with the focus on the balance of society as a whole, instead 
of merely assessing the offender’s desert, Fletcher’s victim-conscious 
version of retributivism collapses into consequentialism. 
Jean Hampton takes a slightly different approach in her victim-
conscious, “expressive theory of retribution.”114 Rather than viewing 
completion of wrongful conduct as the offender gaining dominance or 
an unfair advantage over society, Hampton focuses on “moral injury,” 
defined as “an affront to the victim’s value or dignity.”115 The purpose 
of the expressive theory of retribution is to correct the injury by 
acknowledging and restoring the victim’s value. Punishment, she 
argues, is the appropriate mechanism by which to elevate the value of 
the victim.116 Unlike a parade for the victim, for example, punishment 
creates an actual state of affairs.117 By analogizing retribution to 
 
offenders equally.”). 
 109. See MacLeod, supra note 94, at 42 (“Fletcher’s conception of punishment as a means to 
restore balance between victim and offender is criticized as inconsistent with retributivism . . . Fletcher 
acknowledges some of the difficulties . . . for example, that many crimes involve no dominance over a 
readily-identifiable victim.”). 
 110. Id. at 42-43 (“Avoidance of impunidad, he argues, fills the gap left by his dominated-victim 
theory.”). 
 111. KANT, supra note 3.  
 112. Fletcher, Victims, supra note 6, at 60. 
 113. MacLeod, supra note 93, at 45 (“[Fletcher] has moved from the ranks of retributivists to the 
ranks of consequentialists . . . The community is justified, in Fletcher’s view, in punishing a person in 
order to restore an inherently consequentialist power-imbalance calculus. If this is what Fletcher intends 
to argue, then . . . Fletcher has surrendered his membership in the retributivist club.”). 
 114. Hampton, supra note 88, at 1659. 
 115. Id. at 1666. 
 116. Id. at 1695 (“[P]unishment of the wrongdoer is uniquely suited to do the vindicating, insofar 
as it created a state of affairs . . . in which the victim was elevated with respect to the wrongdoer.”). 
 117. Id. (describing a critic’s inquiry into why we should do harm to the wrongdoer instead of 
bestowing a benefit onto or throwing a parade for the victim, Hampton replies, “[P]unishment of the 
wrongdoer is uniquely suited to do the vindicating, insofar as it created a state of affairs . . . in which the 
victim was elevated with respect to the wrongdoer.”). 
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damages in torts claims, Hampton argues that retributive punishment 
compensates the victim for his or her moral injuries.118 To emphasize 
the importance of the victim, Hampton also argues that the victim must 
be someone other than the wrongdoer himself, rejecting a retributive 
response to someone who attempts suicide.119  
What Fletcher and Hampton both support is a version of retributivism 
that stands in solidarity with victims. Where they differ is in their 
narrower focus. For Fletcher, the wrongdoer gains an advantage over his 
victim. For Hampton, the victim suffers an injury at the hands of the 
wrongdoer. Under both theories, the state must correct an imbalance by 
giving a wrongdoer his just deserts. 
It might be helpful to apply victim-conscious retributivism to the 
conjoined twins problem by altering the problem slightly. Suppose that 
instead of murdering Victim, Guilty Twin inflicts physical injury upon 
Innocent Twin.120 Guilty Twin is clearly guilty and deserves punishment. 
Innocent Twin is not only innocent but is also the very victim of the 
offense. Punishment imposed upon Guilty Twin will necessary be 
imposed upon Innocent Twin-Victim. Victim-conscious retributivists 
justify punishment of wrongdoers by viewing punishment as restoring 
equality between the victim and the offender or as vindicating the value 
of the victim. These theorists adopt punishment as the appropriate 
mechanism to restore equality. However, in this scenario, punishment 
will cause further harm to the victim. Equality may never be restored 
because, so long as Guilty Twin is punished, Innocent Twin-Victim is 
equally punished.  
It may help to frame the theories in mathematical terms. Under 
Fletcher’s theory, the offense puts Guilty Twin at a value of positive one 
(1) and leaves Innocent Twin-Victim at net-zero (0). Punishment should 
be imposed upon Guilty Twin to remove his unfair gain and restore 
equality at 0. However, if punishment counts as negative (-1) with 
respect to Guilty Twin, it also must count as negative one (-1) with 
respect to Innocent Twin-Victim. Thus, Guilty Twin may be brought 
down to net-zero (0), but Innocent Twin-Victim will be reduced to 
negative one (-1). Equality between the offender and the victim cannot 
be restored by using victim-conscious, corrective justice. 
Under Hampton’s theory, the offense causes Innocent Twin-Victim to 
 
 118. See Hampton, supra note 87, at 1698 (“[R]etribution is actually a form of compensation to 
the victim . . . retribution is supposed to . . . [place] the victim in the position she would have been in 
had the wrongdoer not acted.”). 
 119. Id. at 1665 (“We also think it deeply inappropriate to inflict a retributive response on 
someone who has wronged himself.”). 
 120. This alteration was also presented in Retributivism’s Conjoined Twins Problem. Deitch, 
supra note 1, at 977. 
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decrease in value from a net-zero (0) to a negative one (-1). Hampton’s 
theory requires Guilty Twin’s punishment to restore Innocent Twin-
Victim’s value to net-zero (0). But punishing Innocent Twin-Victim 
constitutes a moral injury to Innocent Twin-Victim by violating Innocent 
Twin-Victim’s dignity. Because Innocent Twin-Victim does not deserve 
punishment, his dignity is further reduced by Guilty Twin’s punishment. 
The state’s punishment of Guilty Twin may restore Innocent Twin’s 
value to net-zero (0), but the state’s punishment of Innocent Twin-Victim 
reduces Innocent Twin-Victim’s value down to negative one (-1). Under 
Hampton’s theory, punishment fails to achieve its objective because the 
numeric value of the offender and the victim remain the same. It is also 
worth noting that, because Hampton rejects retributive punishment as a 
response to self-harm, a same-person conceptualization of the conjoined 
twins results in forgoing punishment of the twins. This forgone 
punishment constitutes excessive leniency with respect to Guilty Twin, 
giving Guilty Twin a biologically built-in defense to commit further 
crimes, and fails to restore Innocent Twin’s value. 
Victim-conscious versions of retributivism cannot justify punishment 
of Guilty Twin, because the punishment will necessarily also be inflicted 
on Innocent Twin-Victim. Equality cannot be restored, and the victim’s 
dignity cannot be acknowledged under either result. If the victim suffers 
the same punishment as his aggressor, he will not be restored or 
acknowledged. If punishment is forgone, the victim will not be made to 
suffer through punishment, but neither will the offender. Under either 
result, victim-conscious retributivism fails to achieve its primary goal: 
solidarity with the victim. Thus, victim-conscious retributivism cannot 
satisfy the conjoined twins problem. 
F. Mixed/Hybrid 
In an apparent effort to avoid the criticisms of either broad 
justification of punishment–consequentialism and retributivism – many 
scholars have devised mixed or hybrid theories incorporating aspects of 
both broad theories.121 Because of the volume mixed/hybrid versions of 
retributivism,122 it is not possible to include all of them in this Article. 
 
 121. See Christopher, Deterring, supra note 3, at 867 (“In response to the seemingly intractable 
debate between retributivist and consequentialist theories of punishment, there have been attempts to 
combine the two.”). 
 122. Mixed theories have been offered since Cesare Beccaria presented his theory in 1764, which 
combines utility (consequentialism) with justice (retributivism). See CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES 
AND PUNISHMENTS (David Young trans., 1986) (1764). For a brief overview of Beccaria’s theory, see 
Christopher, Deterring, supra note 3, at 867, n. 128. For an overview of the various mixed theories, see 
IGOR PRIMORATZ, Mixed Rationales, in 2 THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 559-61 
(Christopher Gray ed., Garland, 1999). 
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Instead, this Article discusses two: the most prominent version of mixed 
retributivism and one of the most recent versions.  
H.L.A. Hart presented his theory in 1968,123 and it remains the most 
prominent mixed theory of punishment.124 Hart separates punishment 
justification issues into two categories: the General Justifying Aim and 
Distribution.125 The General Justifying Aim inquiry seeks to justify “the 
practice of a system of punishment.”126 The Distribution inquiry justifies 
“who may be punished.”127 Finally, Hart’s theory also presents a 
proportionality component within the Distribution analysis that justifies 
the amount of punishment imposed.128  
For Hart, the General Justifying Aim of Punishment is reasoned 
supported by consequentialism.129 The means used in individual 
punishments to achieve this Aim is Distribution, which he argues is 
justified by retributivism.130 Hart argues that it is “perfectly consistent” 
to apply consequentialist principles to justify the General Aim and 
retributive principles to justify the Distribution, and that by accepting 
his theory, punishment theorists in retributivist and consequentialist 
camps could cease their centuries-old “shadow-fighting.”131 For 
proportionality, Hart combines elements from retributivism and 
consequentialism to establish a floor and a ceiling, or a minimum and a 
maximum amount of punishment. The consequentialist goal of 
deterrence establishes the floor.132 Retributivism’s degree-based 
negative duty establishes the ceiling.133 Thus, under Hart’s theory, the 
appropriate degree of punishment to impose upon an offender must be 
sufficient to achieve deterrence but must not exceed what the offender 
deserves. Critics accuse Hart’s theory of “being disproportionately 
lenient,”134 because it excludes positive retributivism from its 
 
 123. See HART, supra note 65. 
 124. See Christopher, Deterring, supra note 3, at 867-68 (“Among these mixed theories of 
punishment, the most influential is H.L.A. Hart’s.”). 
 125. See HART, supra note 65, at 8-13.  
 126. Id. at 8. 
 127. Id. at 11. 
 128. See Christopher, Deterring, supra note 3, at 869 (“Hart’s mixed theory [has] its own 
difficulty in setting the amount of punishment.”). 
 129. See HART, supra note 65, at 9 (“[T]he General Justifying Aim of the practice of punishment 
is its beneficial consequences[.]”). 
 130. Id. at 9 (“[T]he pursuit of this General Aim should be qualified or restricted out of deference 
to principles of Distribution which require that punishment should only be of an offender for an 
offence.”). 
 131. Id. at 9 
 132. See Christopher, Deterring, supra note 3, at 869 (“[D]eterrence concerns set the lower limit 
on how much punishment to impose.”). 
 133. Id. (“The negative retributivism component sets the upper limit . . . on how much punishment 
to impose.”). 
 134. Id. 
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proportionality inquiry. For example, if deterrence is not achieved by the 
punishment of a particular offender for a particular offense, then 
punishment is impermissible, because the deterrence sets the floor for 
the amount of punishment.135  
To summarize Hart’s theory, the General Justifying Aim is satisfied 
by consequentialism, Distribution is justified by retributivism, and 
proportionality combines deterrence and degree-based negative 
retributivism to establish a range of acceptable degrees of punishment. 
With respect to the conjoined twins problem, the General Justifying Aim 
of punishment is unproblematic. Consequentialist goals can justify a 
system of punishment that punishes murderers. The conjoined twins 
problem raises questions of individual assignments of punishment. 
Therefore, Hart’s justifications of Distribution and proportionality are 
the focal points of the conjoined twins problem because the inquiry is 
whether (and how much) punishment of Guilty Twin can be justified 
when Innocent Twin will also necessarily suffer the punishment.  
Applying Hart’s theory’s Distribution component to the conjoined 
twins problem presents largely the same issues that other versions of 
permissive retributivism face in their resolutions. Distribution only 
permits punishment “of an offender for an offence.”136 Guilty Twin is an 
offender who has committed the immoral and illegal offense of murder. 
Innocent Twin is free from guilt. Punishment of Guilty Twin is 
permissible; punishment of Innocent Twin is prohibited. Hart’s theory 
does not obligate punishment of each and every guilty person; it merely 
permits punishment. As described above, critics note that Hart’s theory 
cannot justify punishment of a guilty offender if deterrence is not 
achieved by the punishment. Because punishment of Innocent Twin–
who is not an offender who committed an offense–is prohibited under 
this theory, and punishment of Guilty Twin is merely permissible and 
not obligatory, Hart would likely forgo punishment of Guilty Twin. 
Forgoing punishment of Guilty Twin raises the same issues that negative 
retributivists face.  
If proponents of Hart’s theory instead elect to punish Guilty Twin, as 
an offender who would be punished for an egregious offense, they 
violate their duty not to punish Innocent Twin. Even apart from violating 
the “who may we punish” prong of Distribution, they also face 
considerable trouble in assigning the appropriate degree of punishment. 
The charged offense is murder. The minimum punishment to deter 
murder is presumably high, because murder is an offense that society 
 
 135. Id. (explaining that retributivist critics of Hart’s theory deem it “disproportionately lenient in 
. . . not justifying any punishment at all of guilty wrongdoers where deterrence could not be 
promoted.”). 
 136. HART, supra note 65, at 9. 
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especially wishes to prevent. Protecting this heightened societal interest 
in preventing murder justifies a greater degree of punishment. The 
maximum punishment for Guilty Twin is also high, because a murder 
conviction makes one eligible for punishments as severe as life 
imprisonment or capital punishment under desert-based rationales. Thus, 
both the floor and the ceiling are elevated for Guilty Twin. However, 
because Innocent Twin deserves no punishment, the ceiling is actually 
no punishment at all. Interestingly, proponents of Hart’s theory could 
make a persuasive argument that the floor can be set with respect to 
Innocent Twin. Recall that punishment of Innocent Twin is unjustified in 
the “who may be punished” prong and that this argument only succeeds 
in the proportionality prong; thus, by the time this argument is 
presented, the Hart theorist has already violated his theory. To 
successfully argue that the floor can be satisfied with respect to Innocent 
Twin, the Hart theorist must show that punishment could deter future 
offenses. Certainly, specific deterrence would be achieved with respect 
to Guilty and Innocent Twin. General deterrence might also be achieved 
through the direct punishment of Guilty Twin and the vicarious 
punishment of Innocent Twin. Therefore, if the Hart theorist avoids the 
“who may be punished” prong of the Distribution inquiry, he could 
make an interesting argument that the floor requires a high punishment. 
However, the ceiling, with respect to Innocent Twin, is no punishment at 
all. Thus, the maximum punishment with respect to Innocent Twin 
requires no punishment, but the minimum could justify a high degree of 
punishment. Hart recognizes this possibility and emphasizes the 
importance of the “who may be punished” prong, arguing that, while 
vicarious punishment of an offender’s family could achieve 
consequentialist objectives, it is unjustified under the retributive 
principles.  
Thus, Guilty Twin may permissibly be punished under Hart’s theory. 
Innocent Twin must not be punished under Hart’s theory. The proponent 
of Hart’s theory must forgo punishing both twins. This gives a 
disproportionately lenient punishment with respect to Guilty Twin–more 
precisely, it results in the release of a known murderer. Thus, although 
this mixed theory attempts to reconcile the differences between the two 
competing, broad theories of punishment and avoid the criticisms lodged 
against each, the conjoined twins problem shows that it actually falls 
subject to the criticisms leveled against both theories. Under its 
consequentialist components, it can justify the intentional punishment of 
Innocent Twin. Under its retributive components, it cannot justify 
punishment of Innocent Twin and does not require punishment of Guilty 
Twin. Although forgoing punishment is a solution to the conjoined twins 
problem, it demonstrates that Hart’s theory is an insufficient justification 
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of punishment. Under this theory, a known murderer must be released. 
The conjoined twins problem provides an example of why Hart’s theory 
is disproportionately lenient. However, the conjoined twins problem also 
exposes an additional vulnerability of Hart’s theory. Note again that this 
theory’s purpose is to combine the favorable aspects of both 
consequentialism and retributivism. Consequentialism can resolve the 
conjoined twins problem by considering consequences apart from 
deterrence, including the bad consequences for society if a known 
murderer goes unpunished by virtue of a biologically built-in defense. In 
other words, a consequentialist could make a defensible argument that 
the interests of society (especially with respect to public safety) in not 
providing a known murderer with a license to literally get away with 
murder outweigh the bad consequences of punishing an innocent. By 
holding onto retributivist principles that preclude a satisfactory 
resolution for the conjoined twins problem, Hart fails in his ultimate 
goal to create a bulletproof theory that combines the two broad theories. 
His theory is subject to the same criticisms leveled against negative 
retributivism. 
 Mitchell Berman presents a recent mixed theory of punishment, 
which he terms “an integrated dualist theory of punishment.”137 Rather 
than taking Hart’s approach and dividing the stages of punishment and 
questions presented at those stages into categories and assigning 
retributivist or consequentialist justifications to each category, Berman 
divides cases into two categories. These categories are “core cases” and 
“peripheral cases.”138 Core cases are cases that are correctly adjudicated 
so the person being punished is factually and legally guilty.139 Because 
core cases involve punishment of an actual offender for an actual 
offense, the punishment in these cases can be justified under retributive 
terms.140 By contrast, peripheral cases are situations where punishment 
is imposed upon a person who is not factually guilty (e.g., where there is 
a mistaken identity) or legally guilty (e.g., the conduct fails to satisfy 
each element of the criminal offense).141 Peripheral cases, which “all 
involve genuine . . . error,”142 can be justified under consequentialist 
terms.143 A third type, which Berman calls “degenerate cases,” involves 
intentional punishment of known innocents.144 Because these 
 
 137. Mitchell N. Berman, Punishment and Justification, 118 ETHICS 258, 259 (2008). 
 138. Id. at 260. 
 139. Id.  
 140. Id. (“[C]ore cases of punishment are justified . . . on retributivist grounds.”). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Berman, supra note 137, at 262. 
 143. Id. at 260-61 ([P]eripheral cases of punishment are justified . . . on consequentialist 
grounds.”). 
 144. Id. at 262 (discussing degenerate cases, including cases of scapegoating or prosecutorial 
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punishments infringe on the rights of the innocent who do not deserve to 
be punished, these cases are not justifiable.145  
Applying Berman’s theory to the conjoined twins problem requires 
only a brief discussion. Because his theory separates punishments into 
separate “cases,” his theory operates under the separatist presumption 
that the person being punished is a separate individual. The following 
application assumes that the twins are two persons and treats 
punishment of each as a separate case.146 Punishment of Guilty Twin 
constitutes a core case, justified under retributivist principles. Because 
Guilty Twin is factually and legally guilty of murder, his punishment is 
justified. But punishing Guilty Twin requires the Berman proponent to 
open a degenerate case with respect to Innocent Twin, because Innocent 
Twin is an identifiable, known innocent. Although punishment of Guilty 
Twin is justified, the punishment of Innocent Twin is unjustified. 
Punishment of Guilty Twin requires the state to engage in unjustified 
scapegoating of Innocent Twin for the sole purpose of achieving the 
conviction and punishment of Guilty Twin. Thus, Berman’s theory fails 
to justify punishment of the twins. The proponent of the Berman theory 
must then forgo punishment of the Guilty Twin. This exposes Berman’s 
theory to the same criticisms leveled against other impure versions of 
retributivism, including excessive leniency by requiring the release of 
Guilty Twin, a known murderer.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Application of the conjoined twins problem to impure versions of 
retributivism–deontological, consequentialist, threshold, negative/weak, 
victim-conscious, and mixed–reveals that there is no version of 
retributivism that can satisfy the problem of conjoined twins. Even 
where a theory seems to successfully resolve the problem by providing 
an answer (usually declining to punish), that resolution exposes the 
theory to additional criticisms. The conjoined twins problem is either 
unresolvable under each theory, or it exposes flaws within the theory. 
No desert-based justification for punishment can satisfactorily resolve 




 145. Id. at 280 (“[R]ights infringing would be infliction of suffering that is not genuinely 
supposed to be deserved, which supports the widespread judgment that . . . degenerate cases of 
punishment are not justified.”). 
 146. An attempt to apply Berman’s theory another way would be nonsensical, because inquiry 
into the factual and legal guilt of each individual is necessary in a theory that applies different 
justification theories to different types of cases (those involving accurate punishments, those involving 
mistaken punishments, and those involving deliberately inaccurate punishments). 
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